WHAT Does RACE mean?

The following paper will attempt to identify uses for traditional race classification that exists in various fields of study, while discussing reasons for its invalidity in others and as a scientific distinction of human subspecies. What the term “race” actually means in a biological sense will be covered in terms of its definition and also in terms of its current use. In addition the paper will present a review of the function of the term “race” in science and why the study of forensic anthropology, demography and the study of genetic disorder are forced to use traditional race concepts. Next the paper will examine the effects of using invalid race distinctions and the final sections of this paper will deal with the concept of race as an ideological construct and then advance a view into how the individual perceives race. 

The term “race” was first applied to humans in the eighteenth century by Buffon, a French naturalist (Molnar 1998: 19). The concept was spurred by the classificatory schemes of living organisms devised by Linnaeus (Omi & Winant 1983: 76) and was framed around the understanding of early religious accounts, where human diversity was understood against the biblical story of creation (Banton & Harwood 1975: 23).

“Scholars of repute as well as laypersons clung to the belief in human decent from Adam and Eve and in the tales of Noah and his sons of the flood.” (Wolf 1994: 3)

Various and diverse definitions of human races have been proposed, but in general “race” is seen to represent a population that is biologically distinct according to some defined parameter. Is the term “race” a meaningful term? When some people use “race” they attach a biological meaning, still others use “race” as a socially constructed concept.  It is clear that when people use “race” as a socially constructed concept it makes no biological sense.

By “biological race,” this paper refers to the view of race espoused by Robert Knox, that there exist natural, physical divisions among humans that are hereditary, roughly but correctly captured by terms like “Black”, “White”, and “Asian” (or Negroid, Caucasoid, and Mongoloid). Under this view, one’s ancestors and epidermis ineluctably determine membership in a genetically defined racial group. The connection between human physiognomy and racial status is concrete; in the words of Robert Knox,

“…race, or hereditary decent is everything; it stamps the man” (Quoted in Banton 1967: 29)

Despite the prevalent belief in biological races, overwhelming evidence proves that race is not biological. Biological races like Negroid and Caucasoid simply do not exist. There are no genetic characteristics possessed by all Blacks but not by non- Blacks; similarly, there is no gene or cluster of genes common to all Whites but not to non-Whites. One’s race is not determined by a single gene or gene cluster, as is, for example, sickle cell anaemia. Nor are races marked by important differences in gene frequencies, the rates of appearance of certain gene types (Banton & Harwood 1975: Chapter 2). The data compiled by various scientists demonstrates, contrary to popular opinion, that intra-group differences exceed inter-group differences. That is, greater genetic variation exists within the populations typically labelled Black and White than between these populations (Banton & Harwood 1975: 54-55).

This does not mean that individuals are genetically indistinguishable from each other, or even that small population groups cannot be genetically differentiated. Small populations, for example the Xhosa or the Basques, share similar gene frequencies. However, differentiation is a function of separation, usually geographic, and occurs in gradations rather than across fractures.  The notion that humankind can be divided along “White”, “Black”, and “Yellow” lines reveals the social rather than the scientific origin of race.

The term “race” is also used interchangeably with the term “subspecies” by most researchers when race is defined by biological parameters (as opposed to socio-cultural parameters, which would more accurately define “ethnic groups” Banton & Harwood 1975: 61).

“subspecies are geographic segments of a species, which differ morphologically to some degree from other such segments” (Groves 1989: 6).

Thus, a subspecies differentiation is a division of a species into segments with arbitrary physical boundaries. Their boundaries are based more on degree of the variation of specific traits that do not usually prevent interbreeding. The degree of difference needed in the specified traits to allow a subspecies delineation is usually the 75 per cent rule. The 75 per cent rule states that,

“75 per cent of the individuals classified in one subspecies are distinguishable from 100 per cent of the individuals belonging to the other subspecies of the same species, which is statistically equivalent to 90 per cent joint non-overlap” (Groves 1989: 7).

Therefore, a particular subspecies may have no functional differences in their genetic makeup or their anatomical makeup, and the only difference may be something as simple as a different skin colour. This means that if there are definable differences between definable populations, then a separation of humans into separate races is theoretically sound. The problem is that there are no populations that have 100 per cent definable boundaries. There are no functional Reproductive Isolation Mechanisms to prevent interbreeding between human groups, which does not allow definable populations to form that can be uncritically separated into races.

Those researchers who separate humanity into distinct races generally admit that the amount of admixture between perceived races has led to difficulty in determining “original” racial stocks in today’s mobile society. 

“The proponents of this view tend to assume that even if races are poorly definable today, they were at one time much more distinct, but have since interbred to such a degree that they had merged into a continuum” (Groves 1989: 292).

In a scientific sense, the race concept is used to differentiate populations into discrete units of study. Traditional categories of “race” such as “black” and “white” are a viable discrimination in forensic anthropology. Forensic anthropology is forced to use traditional race concepts in order to facilitate the useful distribution of information in courtrooms, to police officers, and to the public that provides the source of data and the audience that must interpret forensic findings.

The use of race is also viable in demographic studies and inheritance patterns as a viable medium for distributing information. Demography encompasses all aspects of society that are measurable statistics (socio-cultural and socio-economic realities). Demography is statistically relevant for a multitude of social reasons that range from voting to religion, and as such is reflective of a society’s view of itself. This places the same restraints on demography as is placed on forensic anthropology since information used in demography must come from individuals who use categories of race such as “black” and “white” and must be presented to individuals who use a similar outmoded racial categories. Thus, the population that is studied and the population that is doing the studying determine the language of demography.

 “For demographers, a population can be defined simply as an aggregation of organisms occupying a given area” (Adams 1990: 8).

Demography uses outmoded racial categories due to the fact that the general public still uses those outmoded racial categories, and the data that is used in demographic studies of “race” are often collected either first-hand or second-hand from individuals from the general public.

The race concept as a unit of study is also important to the study of inheritance, as it refers to disease and its treatment and prevention. Many diseases are heritable, and many of these diseases are more or less customary within certain populations and their derivatives than in others. Diseases such as sickle-cell anaemia, cystic fibrosis, and phenylketonuria are caused when an individual carries a double recessive for the gene(s) that causes the disease (Molnar 1998: 128). In the distribution of information about vulnerability to certain heritable conditions and early detection to high-risk individuals, “race” can be a useful term. In this use of the concept of “race”, categorization of distinct groups in order to determine ancestral migration patterns and origin patterns is not necessary. Only the use of the term to describe those who are vulnerable according to their biological ancestry is needed. Hence, it is not necessary to use definitive categories such as “black”, “white”, etc. since these terms are not specific enough in most cases anyway. The term “white” is not definitive enough when a condition is inherent to an individual ethnic group; an example of this is the high occurrence of Tay-Sachs in Ashkenazic Jewish populations (Molnar 1998: 137).

The effects of making invalid race distinctions between what is biological and what is social in humans, permits the person making these distinctions to give arguments which are of a biological determinist opinion. Determinist arguments are essentialist arguments there are concerned with creating dissimilarity and a hierarchy of difference between races. Nonetheless, the history of science has long been the history of failed efforts to justify these social beliefs. Along the way, various minds have tried to fashion practical human typologies along the following physical axes: skin colour, hair texture, facial angle, jaw size, cranial capacity, brain mass, frontal lobe mass, brain surface fissures and convolutions, and even body odour and lice (Gould 1981).

History shows us the trend of racial oppression; an example of this was seen in the attempts to define racial categories by physical attributes in the dubious testing of workers, soldiers, immigrants, and students in the U.S. The American eugenicists marketed an adapted quotient-based Binet scale (IQ) so that employers, governments, or schools could separate out the “feeble-minded”, and further segregate society along racial lines. The results of these “studies” generated so much concern that the U.S. government passed the Immigration Restriction Act of 1924. Stephen Jay Gould in the Mismeasure of Man details some of the most appalling effects of this act (Gould 1981: Chapter 5).

Attempts to define racial categories by physical attributes have ultimately failed, this does not mean, however, and that biological notions disappeared either from political disclosure or from popular conceptualisation of human variation. The most striking demonstration was the systematic racialised divisions embodied in the apartheid system constructed in South Africa after 1948. Evidence shows that those features usually coded to race, for example, stature, skin colour, hair texture, and facial structure, do not correlate strongly with genetic variation. The rejection of race in science is now almost complete.

The conceptualising of “race” has suggested that certain social relationships are natural and thus inevitable. Social relationships described as “racial” are somatically determined and for this reason outside historical, social determination. Hence, the idea of “race” is transformed into an active subject, a biological reality that determines historical processes (Guillaumin 1980: 39). The analytical task is thus to explain why relationships are interpreted as influential of “race”. Analytical use of “race” masks the fact that “race” is created by humans in historical and material conditions, used to represent and structure the world, in historical conditions and political interests. The idea of “race” is therefore essentially ideological (Guillaumin 1980: 59).  According to historian Barbara Field’s conclusion’s the concept of “race” arose to meet an ideological need and its effectiveness lay in it ability to reconcile freedom and slavery, the idea of race provided:

“…the means of explaining slavery to people whose terrain was a republic founded on racial doctrine of liberty and natural rights” (Fields 1990: 114).

To enhance the answer to the question of “what is race” it is important to understand at the outset where we stand ourselves in regards to race. It is important to ask ourselves what are the domains of our own prejudice. Several factors can influence a person’s response to this question. Firstly our own race, Secondly, how experiences or social interactions have influenced our understanding of the world and people within it. Thirdly, the way in which we perceive our relations with other people.

Any given interaction can result in one of two ways, either a conflict or alternatively a meeting of the minds. What determines this outcome is the embodied history both characters espouse. The real difference between people, is not skin colour, hair texture, and facial structure, it is each individual’s personal experience and personal history.  Incorrect notions in the past have been held onto with real certainty if anything this demonstrates the importance of our own history, when determining whether “race” is a meaningful term.

This paper has attempted to show the uses of the race concept as it applies to humans in both biological and socio-cultural terms. The concept is theoretically sound in abstract, but becomes problematic when applied to modern human populations. The use of modern populations to trace ancestral human divergence patterns is questionable, as is the idea that there are separate biological subspecies of human. The concept is useful in various fields that must gather data and distribute information from and to individuals who use a traditional concept of race, even if it is scientifically unsound and somewhat distasteful. For other applications, ethnicity and distinct cultural, social, and biologically distinct terms may be preferable and more useful than traditional race concepts. The bottom line is, as long as there are distinguishable differences between individuals that are the reflection of different variation in different geographical and/or cultural populations, the race concept will be prevalent and must be dealt with in the most efficient manner as possible.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adams, Julian. (1990). ‘Introduction: Genetics and Demography and Historical Information’ in Convergent Issues in Genetics and Demography, ed. by Julian Adams, David A. Lam, Albert I Hermalin, and Peter E. Smouse. pp. 3-13. New York: Oxford University Press

Baker, R., John. (1981) ‘Race’ Georgia: Foundation for Human Understanding

Banton, Michael. (1967) ‘Race Relations’ London: Tavistock Publications.

Banton, Michael. (1977) ‘The Idea of Race’ London: Tavistock Publications.

Banton, Michael and Harwood, Jonathan. (1975) ‘The Race Concept’ London: David & Charles

Biddiss, D. Michael. (1979) ‘Images of Race’ Victorian Library Ed., Surrey: Leicester University Press.

Gould, Steven J. (1981) ‘The Mismeasure of Man’  New York:      W. W. Norton & Company.

Groves, Colin P. (1989) ‘The Biology of Race’ Berkeley: University of California Press.

Guillaumin, C. (1980) ‘The idea of race and its elevation to autonomous scientific and legal status’ in UNESCO, Sociological Theories: Race and Colonialism, Paris: UNESCO.

Fields, Barbara, Jeanne. (1982) ‘Slavery, Race and Ideology in the united States of America’ New Left Review 181 (May/June 1990)

Linton, Ralph. (1964) ‘The Study of Man’ Student’s Ed., New York: Appleton Century Crofts 

Mason, David. (2000) ‘Race and Ethnicity in Modern Britain’ 2nd Ed., Oxford: OUP

Molnar, Stephen. (1998) ‘Human Variation: Races, Types, and Ethnic Groups’ Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Richards, Graham. (1997) ‘Race, Racism and Psychology: Towards a reflective history’ London: Routledge.

Omi, Michael and Winant, Howard. (1983) ‘By the Rivers of Babylon: Race in the United States’ Socialist Review 13: pp 13-65

Wolf, R., Eric. (1994) ‘Perilous Ideas: Race, Culture, People’ Current Anthropology, Volume 35, Issue 1 (Feb., 1994), pp 1-12